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bstract
We examine the relationship between firm valuation and governance mechanisms, firm characteristics, and institutional factors of the American
epository Receipts (ADRs) domiciled in the Greater China region. We find that China ADRs have the highest market-to-book value ratio followed
y Hong Kong and Taiwan ADRs. It appears that Chinese firms with the poorest external governance environment stand to benefit the most from
ross listing under the ADR programs. Listing in the U.S. that requires more stringent regulations and disclosure rules may strengthen the firms’
overnance practices and thereby enhance their firm value. Among the internal governance mechanisms, institutional ownership and insider
wnership are important for firm value.
2012 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Africagrowth Institute.
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 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.. Introduction
Good corporate governance mechanisms are value enhanc-
ng, and their importance on firm value has long been established
ince the pioneering work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) in
nexus of contracts among various stakeholders. Under the
ubrics of principal–agent conflicts, Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
mphasize that investor protection is crucial. La Porta et al.
1998, 2000, 2002), who examine the importance of external
overnance around the world, show that common-law countries
rovide better shareholder protection than civil-law countries,
nd better shareholder protection is associated with higher val-
ation of corporate assets, and poor shareholder protection is
enalized with lower valuations.
Recent research has focused on the combined determinants of
orporate governance on firm performance. In particular, board∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: actlhp@ccu.edu.tw (L.-H. Pan), Edlin@deakin.edu.au
C.-T. Lin), kchen@csufresno.edu (K.C. Chen).
eer review under responsibility of Africagrowth Institute.
879-9337 © 2012 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of
fricagrowth Institute.
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 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.tructure (Yermack, 1996; Boone et al., 2007; Linck et al., 2008),
EO characteristics (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Basu et al.,
007; Brookman and Thistle, 2009), and ownership structure
Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Ali et al., 2007) have been identified
s key determinants of a firm’s governance practices. Firms with
ore independent directors and higher managerial ownership
re linked to stronger governance and better firm performance.
gainst the backdrops of these findings, Gillan (2006) provides
comprehensive review of internal and external governance
ystems, and their interactions.
In this study, we contribute to the literature as we examine
rm performance across various external governance regimes
nder the American Depository Receipts (ADRs) programs. In
articular, we examine firm performance from the Greater China
egion, namely China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, cross-listed in
he U.S. with stronger law enforcement and investor protection
see La Porta et al., 1998). This is the case for both Level II
nd Level III ADRs that are required to follow the same strin-
ent requirements on governance, disclosure requirements, and
ccounting standards as those of the U.S. firms, especially after
he Sarbane-Oxley Act in 2002 (see Durnev and Kim, 2005;
oidge et al., 2003).1 It could be argued that the ADRs from
1 ADRs under Level I and 144A rules are not listed on a stock exchange and
o not need to comply with the same U.S. requirements. Level II ADRs use
xisting shares to satisfy investor demand and liquidity, and Level III ADRs are
public offering of new shares into the U.S. markets. Both Level II and Level III
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he Greater China region should benefit higher market valuation
rom cross-listing in the U.S.
Part of our interest in examining the impact of ADRs from the
reater China region in relation to corporate governance on firm
alue is motivated by the contrasting external legal environment
nd the internal governance mechanisms (or the lack of them)
mong these markets. Although China’s regulatory framework
as evolved rapidly, its external and internal governance mecha-
isms remain the weakest in comparison to those of Hong Kong
nd Taiwan (see, e.g., Sun and Tong, 2003; Wei, 2007; Tian and
strin, 2008).2 According to La Porta et al. (1998), Taiwan that
ollows the civil-law regime coupled with weaker investor pro-
ection is exposed to a poorer governance environment, whereas
ong Kong with its legal origin from the common-law regime
ends to enjoy stronger legal enforcement.
It follows that while firms based in the Greater China region
njoy close business ties and trades, their exposure to vari-
us governance environments should provide a fertile ground
o examine the differential impact of the ADR listings on firm
alue. Therefore, it is hypothesized that on average, China ADRs
ith the weakest governance mechanisms may benefit the most
n the form of higher firm valuation, followed by Taiwan and
ong Kong ADRs, respectively.
Our results confirm that China ADRs enjoy on average the
ighest market-to-book value ratio after controlling for gover-
ance measures and firm characteristics. It suggests that Chinese
rms, moving from the poorest external governance regime to
he U.S., tend to benefit the most via the ADRs experience.
However, Hong Kong ADRs, embedded with stronger gover-
ance at home, have the next highest market-to-book ratio after
isting in the U.S. and Taiwan ADRs that come from a weaker
overnance regime, on the other hand, appear to gain the least
n terms of market valuation. In our view, these results may be
riven by distinct firm effects that exist among the three mar-
ets. More specifically, Hong Kong ADRs include both Hong
ong-based private-sector firms and China-based state-owned
nterprises listed in Hong Kong, while Taiwan ADRs consist of
rms exclusively in high-tech industries. This contrast in firm
ype implies that Taiwan ADRs are likely to operate in more
ompetitive industries than their Hong Kong counterparts. As
iroud and Mueller (2011) argue that product market com-
etition may act as a substitute for corporate governance as
ompetitive pressure imposes discipline on managers to max-
mize firm value, Taiwan ADRs should, therefore, experience
tronger governance. It follows that Hong Kong ADRs, which
end to be in less competitive industries based on Giroud and
ueller’s proposition and thus weaker governance, should ben-
fit more than Taiwan ADRs from the ADR listings.
Among governance measures, both institutional ownership
nd insider ownership are important for firm value. These results
DRs are traded on one of the three major U.S. exchanges, i.e., NYSE, AMAX,
r NASDAQ.
2 The core regulatory framework consists of The Company Law since 1993,
he Securities Law since 1998, and the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed
ompanies in China since 2002.
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re consistent with prior studies (e.g., McConnell and Servaes,
990; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Cornett et al., 2007) that higher
nsider ownership reduces potential agency conflicts between
nsiders and minority shareholders, and institutional ownership
eems to play an effective monitoring role for the ADR firms.
ur results complement Sun and Tong (2003) who document
hat share issue privatization in China is positively related to
rm performance but state ownership is negatively related to
rm performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
rovides an overview of the corporate governance environment
n the Greater China region. Section 3 discusses sample and
ethodology. Empirical results are reported in Section 4 and
ection 5 concludes the paper.
. Corporate governance in the Greater China region
.1. China
China’s legal regime can be traced to German civil law,
hich is on average weaker than English common law in terms
f investor protection (La Porta et al., 1998). Coupled with
igh proportions of state ownership and control for publicly
isted firms, the corporate governance environment in China is
rguably the weakest among the three markets in the region (see
un and Tong, 2003; Wei, 2007; Tian and Estrin, 2008).3
Since 1990s, China has adopted a two-tier board structure that
omprises the board of directors and the supervisory board to
mprove governance. The aim is to impose a two-layer oversight
n the duty and performance of the senior management. That is,
he board of directors monitors senior managers, and the super-
isory board monitors and evaluates the performance of both
enior managers and the board of directors. The governance of
he board structure has further been strengthened after the Code
f Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China was
ntroduced in 2002 that requires some degree of board indepen-
ence, and qualifications and knowledge of supervisory board
embers.
However, Wei (2007) contends that although these gover-
ance measures were already put in place, most corporate boards
re still characterized by insider control and weak independence.
am (2002), Lin (2004), and Wang (2007) also find that super-
isory boards are ineffective in playing their roles of overseeing
he performance of directors and managers.
The lack of independence of directors and supervisory mem-
ers is perhaps not surprising as the predecessors of Chinese
isted firms are mostly state-owned enterprises (SOEs), whose
anagers are often appointed as directors of the newly privatized
rms. The consequence is that directors are rarely independent
nd managers tend to dominate the governance of the board.
imilarly, most supervisory members are considered insiders
ecause they tend to come from political offices, labor unions,
lose friends, and allies of the senior management (Dahya et al.,
3 The majority of shares outstanding in Chinese firms are non-tradable shares
wned by state/local governments or their affiliated entities.
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003). Furthermore, the supervisory board has limited access to
rm information and has no power in removing directors and
anagers (Lin, 2004; Wang, 2007).
Despite the partial privatization of SOEs, much of the own-
rship structure of Chinese firms remains in the hands of the
tate, with the majority of shares outstanding held by the state
s non-tradable shares. The institutional ownership, therefore,
lays a subtle but yet important role on firm performance, espe-
ially in China. Consistent with this argument, Chen et al. (2006)
xamine the effect of outside directors on corporate fraud and
ocument that Chinese firms with a higher percentage of outside
irectors, such as institutional investors, tend to reduce corpo-
ate fraud. Zhang et al. (2001) and Xu et al. (2005) also show
hat foreign ownership is positively related to the efficiency of
hinese industrial firms.
.2. Hong Kong
Unlike China, Hong Kong follows the common-law regime,
r the Anglo-Saxon legal and governance system. La Porta et al.
1998) show that common-law countries provide both share-
olders and creditors the strongest legal protection compared to
ountries of other types of legal regimes. Within the common-
aw countries, Hong Kong scores well above the average in
fficiency of judicial system, rule of law, and corruption. Cheung
t al. (2007) document that the stock market in Hong Kong
xhibits similar characteristics and practices as those observed in
eveloped economies. International rating agencies rank Hong
ong as one of the more advanced markets in the Asia-Pacific
egion.
However, firms in Hong Kong are characterized by less dif-
used ownership structure than firms in developed markets. They
end to be family owned and managed by family members as
ommonly found in the region. It is not unusual that the chair-
an of the board is also the chief executive officer of the firm.
gency conflicts may therefore arise from this particular type of
wnership structure between controlling families and minority
hareholders.
Since 2005, every publicly listed firm in Hong Kong is
equired to have a minimum of three independent non-executive
irectors on its board. Such requirement may mitigate agency
osts of the firm as outsiders tend to play a more effective role in
onitoring managers. In sum, the corporate governance’s exter-
al environment and governance practices in Hong Kong are
rguably the strongest in comparison to China and Taiwan.
.3. Taiwan
Similar to China, Taiwan’s legal origin comes from German
ivil law. La Porta et al. (1998) report that Taiwan’s efficiency of
udicial system and corruption are poorly ranked, compared to
hose countries with the same German legal origin. The overall
oor investor protection in Taiwan due to its inefficient legal
nvironment suggests that internal governance may play a more
ritical role in enhancing firm value than that in Hong Kong.
Following Germany’s corporate governance structure, board
embers in a Taiwanese firm consist of both directors and
e
i
v
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upervisors. The role of supervisors is only to monitor direc-
ors on their corporate decisions and to review and audit reports
repared for the shareholders. However, the supervisory board
s not as independent as in the German two-tier system. Its mem-
ers can be elected from family members of current employees
nd directors.
Lee and Yeh (2004) report that most controlling families in
aiwan often set up nominal investment firms to increase their
ontrols by sending family members or their designees to the
oard after the investment firms are elected to the board. With
hese governance practices by controlling families, Young et al.
2008) discover that board independence is negatively related to
anagerial ownership and family control. They find that 64%
f firms in Taiwan did not appoint an independent director and
nother 21% of firms elected only one independent director
espite the mandatory requirement of two independent directors
or IPO firms in 2002.
Given that legal regimes and internal governance vary con-
iderably across the Greater China region, it could be argued
hat firms in Hong Kong on average tend to be associated with
he strongest governance mechanisms while those in China tend
o exhibit the weakest governance practices.
. Data and variable deﬁnitions
.1. Sample
The initial sample includes all China, Hong Kong, and
aiwan ADRs listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ dur-
ng 2005–2010. All the ADRs in the sample belong to either
evel II or III listing that requires the listing company to adopt
he U.S. disclosure and governance rules. The starting year 2005
as chosen because China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan should have
dopted governance measures similar to those prescribed in the
arbanes Oxley Act since 2002. The listing information, finan-
ial and governance data of the ADRs were obtained from the
actset database, Compustat, Datastream, and SEC filings. We
hen eliminated ADRs that contained missing financial and gov-
rnance information. The final sample includes 48 China ADRs,
8 Hong Kong ADRs, and 8 Taiwan ADRs for a total of 74 ADRs
nd 444 firm-year observations. Not surprisingly, China has the
argest number of ADRs relative to both Hong Kong and Taiwan.
.2. Market-to-book ratio
Following Chen et al. (2006), Harford et al. (2008), Cheung
t al. (2008), and Linck et al. (2008), we use the market-to-book
alue (M/B) ratio to measure firm performance. Demsetz and
illalonga (2001) suggest that market-based measures such as
/B are more preferable than accounting-based profit ratios (i.e.,
OA and ROE), because the former are forward looking mea-
ures of corporate performance whereas the latter are backward
ooking constrained by accounting standards and practices. For
xample, accounting rules may be applied differently to valu-
ng tangible and intangible capitals, and taxation systems may
ary with firms of different ownership structures. In contrast,
/B should fairly reflect future profitability of a firm perceived
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y the market without the accounting constraints. Furthermore,
/B tends to capture the market’s views on governance mecha-
isms as a means to reduce agency costs and enhance corporate
erformance.
Regarding explanatory variables, we follow extant literature
nd categorize metrics of governance mechanisms, firm charac-
eristics, and institutional factors into 6 groups as follows: board
tructure, CEO characteristics, ownership structure, firm charac-
eristics, legal regime dummies, and stock exchange dummies.
hese measures are defined in Appendix A.
.3. Board structure
We include percentage of independent directors, CEO duality,
nd non-executive chairman when the chairman is not an execu-
ive member of the company for measures under board structure.
ndependent directors, who are non-executive or non-employee
irectors, may play a more effective role in monitoring man-
gement to meet shareholders’ expectations. Borokhovich et al.
1996), Krivogorsky (2006), and Adams and Ferreira (2007)
how that independent directors lower monitoring costs that in
urn enhances firm performance.
When the CEO is also the chairman of the board, Fama and
ensen (1983) contend that it may impede the effectiveness of
oard monitoring as the decision making and control is endowed
ithin one individual. Rechner and Dalton (1991), and Bhagat
nd Bolton (2008) show that non-duality firms outperform dual-
ty firms. Bai et al. (2004) also report a negative relationship
etween CEO duality and market value for Chinese firms.
.4. CEO characteristics
CEO characteristics refer to the number of years that a CEO
as held the position. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) suggest
hat CEO tenure does not seem to affect firm profitability for
horter CEO tenures but firm profitability declines when CEO
enure is more than 15 years. In a follow-up study, Hermalin
nd Weisbach (1998) conclude that board independence will
enerally decline with CEO tenure. When a CEO has worked
or the company for a longer period of time, he/she tends to have
ore influence on the directors of the board, which is detrimental
o board independence and the effectiveness of monitoring.
On the other hand, CEO tenure serves as a proxy for board
eadership and measures the extent of CEO experience that may
elp companies to tackle difficulties and increase profits. This
rgument is supported by Linck et al. (2008) and Brookman and
histle (2009), who show that CEO tenure has a positive effect
n firm performance.
.5. Ownership structure
Insiders include employees, directors, and managers who
njoy information advantage about the firm over the market.
cConnell and Servaes (1990) find a strong curvilinear relation
etween corporate value and insider ownership, and a signifi-
antly positive relation between corporate value and institutional
wnership.
(
K
t
mment Finance 2 (2012) 43–52
Conversely, firms whose managers have high levels of con-
rol rights (relative to cash flow rights) experience lower stock
eturns. Lemmon and Lins (2003) show that the corporate own-
rship structure in eight East Asian countries plays an influential
ole in determining the incentives of insiders to expropriate
inority shareholders during the times of declining investment
pportunities. In examining the relation between ownership and
arket value among Chinese firms, Bai et al. (2004) report that
igh ownership concentration is positively related to market
alue.
Based on the above findings, we include percentage of
nstitutional ownership and percentage of insider ownership
s proxies for ownership structure. However, McConnell and
ervaes (1990) suggest that when the percentage of insider own-
rship reaches a threshold, an increase in insider ownership may
ecrease firm value. Hence, we also include a squared term
f insider ownership as a measurement of the potential non-
inear relationship between percentage of insider ownership and
orporate value.
.6. Firm characteristics and institutional factors
We further include firm-specific and institutional-control
ariables to isolate the effect of governance measures on firm
erformance. They include debt-to-equity ratio, trading volume,
ompany age, and firm size (natural log). Legal regime dummies
China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) and stock-exchange dummies
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) are used to control for the fixed
ffects of legal regimes and stock exchanges.
. Empirical results
.1. Summary statistics
We first present the summary statistics of the sample ADRs
n Table 1. Panel A reports the aggregate statistics for the whole
ample, and Panels B, C, and D present summary statistics for
hina, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, respectively.
We find that the average market-to-book (M/B) ratio is 2.79
or the whole sample, a high market valuation relative to book
alue. It implies that the sample ADRs with high market val-
ation are perhaps seeking external funding and/or increasing
nvestor base beyond their local markets by listing on the U.S.
tock exchanges. Among them, those from China enjoy the high-
st market-to-book ratio of 3.17, followed by those from Taiwan
f 1.99 and Hong Kong of 1.96. Firms from the weakest exter-
al governance regime (i.e., China) appear to enjoy the highest
arket valuation relative to those from stronger governance
egimes.
Consistent with the literature that CEO duality is more
ommon in the region than in the U.S. or U.K., 31% of the
ample ADRs appoint their CEOs as the chairman of the board
CEO DUALITY) and only 4% with non-executive chairman
NONEXE CHAIR). As discussed in Section 2, firms in Hong
ong and Taiwan are more likely to be family-controlled such
hat CEOs who tend to be a family member also serve as chair-
an of the board. Although CEO duality is lower for China
L.-H. Pan et al. / Review of Development Finance 2 (2012) 43–52 47
Table 1
Summary statistics of the sample firms.
Variables Mean P25 P50 P75 St. dev.
Panel A: whole sample
M/B 2.79 0.97 1.76 3.30 3.28
CEO DUALITY 0.31 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.47
NONEXE CHAIR 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20
INDEP PCT 0.24 0.00 0.27 0.42 0.24
CEO TENURE 4.47 2.00 4.00 6.00 3.77
INST PCT 18.68 4.19 11.12 25.48 20.79
INSIDER PCT 47.69 21.32 43.73 74.29 28.47
DEBT EQUITY 24.54 0.00 1.44 21.03 72.99
AGE 18.67 9.00 13.00 23.00 15.11
VOLUME 1.06 0.12 0.32 1.17 1.81
SIZE 6.62 4.93 6.12 8.35 2.50
Panel B: China ADRs
M/B 3.17 1.08 1.87 3.64 3.75
CEO DUALITY 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.45
NONEXE CHAIR 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12
INDEP PCT 0.25 0.00 0.27 0.54 0.26
CEO TENURE 4.09 2.00 4.00 6.00 3.20
INST PCT 20.35 2.90 9.76 27.42 24.16
INSIDER PCT 51.12 21.58 47.69 77.57 29.39
DEBT EQUITY 25.79 0.00 0.50 18.42 85.43
AGE 18.05 9.00 12.00 20.00 16.09
VOLUME 1.12 0.10 0.31 1.27 1.84
SIZE 6.41 4.95 5.91 7.82 2.30
Panel C: Hong Kong ADRs
M/B 1.96 0.61 1.46 2.61 1.83
CEO DUALITY 0.36 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.48
NONEXE CHAIR 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34
INDEP PCT 0.21 0.00 0.21 0.40 0.20
CEO TENURE 4.68 2.00 4.00 6.00 4.55
INST PCT 13.41 3.03 8.98 22.26 12.51
INSIDER PCT 52.19 27.03 64.41 70.19 23.48
DEBT EQUITY 18.89 0.00 4.53 22.49 33.30
AGE 20.77 10.00 15.00 31.00 14.84
VOLUME 0.47 0.05 0.19 0.51 0.70
SIZE 6.37 4.18 5.64 8.90 2.99
Panel D: Taiwan ADRs
M/B 1.99 1.29 1.88 2.62 1.18
CEO DUALITY 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.51
NONEXE CHAIR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
INDEP PCT 0.26 0.00 0.33 0.38 0.20
CEO TENURE 6.17 3.00 5.00 7.50 4.32
INST PCT 19.26 12.49 18.32 25.48 8.17
INSIDER PCT 20.00 7.72 18.94 36.28 12.17
DEBT EQUITY 26.95 0.08 4.38 49.84 38.23
AGE 17.75 11.00 17.00 24.50 7.60
VOLUME 1.81 0.54 0.95 1.89 2.58
SIZE 8.28 7.06 8.81 9.56 1.97
This table presents the summary statistics of ADRs in the Greater China region during 2005–2010. M/B is the stock price per share divided by book value per share.
CEO DUALITY is a dummy variable that equals one when the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. NONEXE CHAIR is a dummy variable
that equals one when the chairman of the board is not an executive member, and zero otherwise. INDEP PCT is the percentage of independent directors on the board.
CEO TENURE is the number of years the CEO has held his/her title. INST PCT is the number of shares held by institutional investors as a percentage of current
total outstanding shares. INSIDER PCT is the number of shares held by insiders as a percentage of current total outstanding shares. DEBT EQUITY is the long-term
debt-to-equity ratio; SIZE is the natural log of market capitalization, where the firm’s market value is measured in millions of dollars. AGE is the number of years
since the company starts (up to 2010). VOLUME is the 52-week average of the volume of shares traded. P25, P50, P75 denote 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile,
respectively.
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DRs relative to Hong Kong and Taiwan ADRs, it remains high
y western standards.
The average age of sample ADRs is more than 18 years across
hich Hong Kong ADRs are on average more mature (20.77
ears) than their counterparts (18.05 and 17.75 years for China
nd Taiwan ADRs, respectively). On the contrary, the average
EO tenure is only 4.47 years, with a range from 4.09 years of
hina ADRs to 6.17 years of Taiwan ADRs, implying frequent
EO turnovers.
Since the regulations in all three markets require mandatory
ndependent directors, the average percentage of independent
irectors is relatively high at 24%. However, the variability
cross these three markets appears to be small, with the highest
ercentage of independent directors of 26% found from Taiwan
DRs.
Insider ownership on average nears 50%, driven largely by
igh insider ownership of China and Hong Kong ADRs exceed-
ng 50%. In contrast, because Taiwan ADRs are skewed towards
echnology-related firms characterized by more diffused owner-
hip, the average insider ownership is relatively low of 20%.
Finally, institutional investors seem to actively invest in the
DRs. They hold an average of 18.68% of total shares outstand-
ng. Most noticeably, China and Taiwan ADRs attract about 20%
f institutional investment compared to around 13% for Hong
ong ADRs. It appears that institutional investors in recent years
ave shown more interest in Chinese firms. Taiwan ADRs, a
luster of high-tech firms, also appear to draw a similar level of
nstitutional interest.
.2. Univariate results
Table 2 presents the results of differences in means of M/B,
overnance measures, and firm characteristics of the China,
ong Kong, and Taiwan ADRs reported in Table 1. The first row
or each variable under the “difference” column shows the sta-
istical difference, if any, between China and Hong Kong ADRs.
he second row reports the difference between Hong Kong
nd Taiwan ADRs while the third row presents the difference
etween Taiwan and China ADRs.
As shown in Table 2, China ADRs exhibit higher market
aluations than Hong Kong and Taiwan ADRs. There appears,
owever, little difference in M/B between Hong Kong and
aiwan ADRs. We find that very few firm characteristics or inter-
al governance measures shown in Table 2 are consistent with
he differences in M/B. The legal regime where the external gov-
rnance environment differs significantly between China and the
ther two markets remains the primary candidate to explain the
xtent of the firm valuation differences.
Before we conduct a multivariate regression analysis on the
ffect of governance measures on firm performance, we calcu-
ate the correlations between governance measures to examine
otential multicollinearity problems. Table 3 presents the cor-
elations using both Pearson (in upper diagonal) and Spearman
ank (in lower diagonal) estimates.
The cross correlations between the six governance variables
re generally low with the exception between institutional and
nsider ownership (0.54 or 0.56). These two measures are,
o
o
o
fment Finance 2 (2012) 43–52
owever, expected to contrast each other because a higher
roportion of insider ownership implies a lower institutional
wnership. Institutional investors also become less important in
onitoring managers as agency costs tend to be lower when
nsiders hold a higher proportion of share ownership. To ensure
egression results are robust to the potential multicollinearity
roblem, we run several regression estimates with various com-
inations of controlled variables.
.3. Regression results
Sequel to the preliminary results, we estimate the following
egression to examine the effect of governance measures on firm
aluation:
/Bi = α + β1BS + β2CEO + β3OS + β4CC + β5LD
+β6SD + εi (1)
here M/Bi is the market-to-book value ratio for firm i; BS,
EO, OS, and CC are vectors of board structure variables, CEO
haracteristics, ownership structure, and company characteris-
ics, respectively; LD and SD are dummy variables for legal
egimes and stock exchanges, respectively; and εi is the error
erm.
One common problem in examining the relationship between
orporate governance and firm performance is the potential
ndogeneity effect of governance measures documented in
immelberg et al. (1999), Cho (1998), and Bhagat and Bolton
2008). An increase in firm value may lead to better governance
ractices rather than what is being investigated here. To address
uch effect, we first use firm size, debt-to-equity ratio, and return
n equity as instrumental variables for institutional ownership,
nd we then use the predicted institutional ownership in the
egression analysis. Furthermore, we consider lagged market-
o-book ratio, lagged leverage, and lagged board structure. The
esults using these instrumental variables are robust to those
eported in this section. We also follow Black et al. (2006) and
etersen (2008) by applying adjusted standard errors due to the
orrelations between the same companies in different years.
Table 4 reports the regression results based on Eq. (1). Col-
mn 1 first shows the effect of board structure along with
rm characteristics, legal regime dummies, and exchange dum-
ies on the market-to-book value (M/B) ratio. Among the
easures for board structure, only percentage of independent
irectors (INDEP PCT) is marginally but negatively significant
t the 10% level. The negative relation therefore contradicts
he standard agency theory, which posits that an increase in
he proportion of independent directors reduces principal–agent
onflicts. Including other governance measures, however, shows
hat it is not an important consideration for market valuation (see
olumn 4 in Table 4).
Similar to board structure measures, the duration of CEO
enure as shown in columns 2 and 4 carries little consequence
n ADR performance. Given that the average tenure period is
nly 4.47 years (see Table 1), the short CEO tenure and its lack
f variability across ADRs may explain why it fails to account
or firm performance.
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Table 2
Sample mean comparisons among China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan ADRs.
Variable Legal regime Mean SE Differencea N
M/B China ADRs 3.17 0.23 1.21*** 269
Hong Kong ADRs 1.96 0.20 −0.03 81
Taiwan ADRs 1.99 0.18 −1.18** 45
CEO DUALITY China ADRs 0.27 0.03 −0.09 224
Hong Kong ADRs 0.36 0.05 −0.11 83
Taiwan ADRs 0.47 0.08 0.20*** 36
NONEXEC CHAIR China ADRs 0.01 0.01 −0.12*** 221
Hong Kong ADRs 0.13 0.04 0.13** 83
Taiwan ADRs 0.00 0.00 −0.01** 36
INDEP PCT China ADRs 0.25 0.02 0.04 251
Hong Kong ADRs 0.21 0.02 −0.04 84
Taiwan ADRs 0.26 0.03 0.01 43
CEO TENURE China ADRs 4.09 0.22 −0.58 213
Hong Kong ADRs 4.68 0.48 −1.49** 90
Taiwan ADRs 6.17 0.72 2.07*** 36
INST PCT China ADRs 20.35 1.62 6.94*** 222
Hong Kong ADRs 13.41 1.44 −5.85*** 75
Taiwan ADRs 19.27 1.26 −1.08 42
INSIDER PCT China ADRs 51.12 1.87 −1.08 246
Hong Kong ADRs 52.19 2.57 32.19*** 83
Taiwan ADRs 20.00 1.83 −31.11*** 44
DEBT EQUITY China ADRs 25.79 5.26 6.90 264
Hong Kong ADRs 18.89 3.75 −8.05 79
Taiwan ADRs 26.95 5.52 1.15 48
AGE China ADRs 18.05 0.95 −2.72 285
Hong Kong ADRs 20.77 1.45 3.02 105
Taiwan ADRs 17.75 1.10 −0.30 48
VOLUME China ADRs 1.12 0.11 0.65*** 280
Hong Kong ADRs 0.47 0.07 −1.34*** 88
Taiwan ADRs 1.81 0.37 0.69** 48
SIZE China ADRs 6.41 0.14 0.04 272
Hong Kong ADRs 6.37 0.32 −1.91*** 86
Taiwan ADRs 8.28 0.28 1.87*** 48
This table provides sample mean comparisons and t-test values for China, Hong Kong and Taiwan ADRs during 2005–2010.
a Reports difference in means in the following order: between China ADRs and Hong Kong ADRs, between Hong Kong ADRs and Taiwan ADRs, and between
Taiwan ADRs and China ADRs.
** Significance level of 5%.
*** Significance level of 1%.
Table 3
Cross correlations of governance measures.
CEO DUALITY NONEXE CHAIR INDEP PCT CEO TENURE INST PCT INSIDER PCT
CEO DUALITY −0.14*** 0.18*** 0.27*** −0.06 0.12**
NONEXE CHAIR −0.15** 0.17*** −0.06 −0.14** 0.02*
INDEP PCT 0.26*** 0.20*** −0.15** −0.03 0.05
CEO TENURE 0.28*** −0.08 −0.17** 0.01 −0.19***
INST PCT −0.08 −0.22*** −0.05 0.05 −0.54***
INSIDER PCT 0.15** 0.01 0.12* −0.11* −0.56***
This table presents the correlation coefficients between the governance measures. The Pearson correlation coefficients are above the diagonal and the Spearman rank
correlation coefficients are below the diagonal.
* Significance level of 10%.
** Significance level of 5%.
*** Significance level of 1%.
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Table 4
Regressions of firm performance on governance measures.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
INTERCEPT −2.49 −1.64 −4.77*** −4.03*
(0.16) (0.36) (0.00) (0.06)
Board structure
CEO DUALITY 0.63 1.99**
(0.30) (0.03)
NONEXE CHAIR 0.71 0.08
(0.39) (0.91)
INDEP PCT −2.22* −1.79
(0.07) (0.24)
CEO characteristics
CEO TENURE 0.06 0.03
(0.58) (0.85)
Ownership structure
INST PCT 0.07** 0.10**
(0.03) (0.04)
INSIDER PCT 0.08*** 0.08**
(0.00) (0.04)
INSIDER PCT2 −0.08*** −0.08*
(0.00) (0.06)
Company characteristics
DEBT EQUITY 0.01** 0.00** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
SIZE 0.61*** 0.46*** 0.50*** 0.35**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
AGE −0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.01
(0.97) (0.55) (0.76) (0.37)
VOLUME 0.04 −0.02 −0.13 −0.15
(0.68) (0.80) (0.18) (0.25)
Legal regime dummies
Hong
Kong
−1.10** −1.17* −0.67 −1.13*
(0.03) (0.05) (0.21) (0.09)
Taiwan −1.53** −1.27* −1.53** −2.15*
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05)
Exchange dummies
NASDAQ 3.31*** 3.00*** 2.92*** 2.82***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
AMEX 2.38** 1.66* 1.96*** 1.64
(0.04) (0.09) (0.00) (0.12)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 296 293 286 184
Adj. R2 0.22 0.20 0.24 0.24
This table presents the regressions results of firm performance as proxy by Market-to-Book ratio on governance measures. CEO DUALITY is a dummy variable
that equals one when the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. NONEXE CHAIR is a dummy variable that equals one when the chairman
of the board is not an executive member, and zero otherwise. INDEP PCT is the percentage of independent directors on the board; CEO TENURE is the number
of years the CEO has held his/her title. INST PCT is the number of shares held by institutional investors as a percentage of the current total shares outstanding.
INSIDER PCT is the number of shares held by insiders as a percentage of the current total shares outstanding. INSIDER PCT2 is the square of the insider ownership
percentage. DEBT EQUITY is the long-term debt-to-equity ratio; SIZE is the natural log of market capitalization in millions of dollars. AGE is the number of years
the company has been in existence (up to 2010); VOLUME is the 52-week average of the volume of shares traded; Legal regime dummies are dummy variables
to indicate the legal regime the firm belongs to. Exchange dummies are stock exchange dummy variables where the stock is traded. P-values are presented in the
parentheses.
* Significance level of 10%.
*
p
e
e
o
a
a
i
b** Significance level of 5%.
** Significance level of 1%.
For the effect of ownership structure, we include the
ercentage of institutional and insider ownership. Since the
ffect of insider ownership may potentially be curvilin-
ar, we also include a squared term. Columns 3 and 4
f Table 4 show that these two governance mechanisms
re positively related to the M/B ratio. While these results
t
i
ire consistent with the standard finance theory that higher
nsider and institutional ownerships lower agency conflicts
etween management and minority shareholders, their rela-
ionships do not appear to be economically significant. An
ncrease of one standard deviation in insider ownership and
nstitutional ownership corresponds with a 2.1% and 2% change
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n M/B, respectively. It suggests that their impacts on market
aluation are limited.
In contrast to the limited effects of governance measures
nd firm characteristics, we find that legal regime explains
reater variations in the M/B ratio. As shown in Table 4,
hina ADRs experience significantly higher M/B than both
ong Kong and Taiwan ADRs. In fact, switching from China
DRs to either Hong Kong or Taiwan ADRs on average low-
rs market equity relative to book equity by more than a
actor of 1. As China has the weakest governance environ-
ent in the Greater China region, the Chinese firms under the
DR programs have the most to benefit from listing in the
.S.
However, Hong Kong ADRs enjoy a higher market valuation
han Taiwan ADRs after listing in the U.S. This result appears to
ontradict the hypothesis that ADRs from a weaker governance
egime should benefit more from the ADR programs. However,
hen we investigate firm types between Hong Kong and Taiwan
DRs, we found that Hong Kong ADRs are made up of not only
ong Kong-based firms but also China-based state-owned enter-
rises listed in Hong Kong, whereas all Taiwan ADRs consist
f firms in high-tech industries. The apparent firm effects sug-
est that Taiwan ADRs are likely to operate in more competitive
ndustries compared to Hong Kong ADRs. According to Giroud
nd Mueller (2011), Taiwan ADRs should on average experi-
nce stronger governance because product market competition
erves as a good substitute for corporate governance. Conse-
uently, Hong Kong ADRs with weaker governance on average
end to gain more from the ADR listings.
. Conclusion
In their seminal papers on corporate governance, La Porta
t al. (1998, 2000, 2002) show that external governance regime
s an important determinant for firm performance. Stronger gov-
rnance that provides better investor protection leads to higher
rm value. We extend their studies by comparing the perfor-
ance of firms from the Greater China region that cross-list in
he U.S. under the ADR programs. In particular, we compare
rm valuation between ADRs domiciled in China, Hong Kong,
nd Taiwan, which although share close business and trade ties
iffer significantly in their external governance backgrounds.
Consistent with the extant literature, we find that Chinese
rms with the weakest governance environment tend to gain the
ost under the ADR programs after subject to the stringent regu-
ations and disclosure rules in the U.S. In comparison, the ADRs
rom Hong Kong and Taiwan experience relatively lower market
aluation due to their stronger external governance environments
t home.
Despite the importance of some firm characteristics and inter-
al governance mechanisms on firm value, our results suggest
hat the impact of external governance backgrounds far out-
eighs those within the firms. They imply that policy effortshould be directed more at the macro level than at the firm
evel as the former appears to be more influential in lowering
rincipal–agent conflicts.
A
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ppendix A.
Variables are classified into seven categories: performance
easure, board structure, CEO characteristics, ownership struc-
ure, company characteristics, legal regime dummies, and stock
xchange dummies.
ariable Definition
erformance measure
/B Price per share of common stock divided by book
value per share of common stock, measured in
percentage
oard structure
EO DUALITY Dummy variable equals one when the CEO is also
the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise
ONEXE CHAIR Dummy variable equals one when the chairman of
the board is not an executive member, and zero
otherwise
NDEP PCT The percentage of independent directors in the board
EO characteristics
EO TENURE The number of years the CEO has held his/her title
wnership structure
NST PCT The number of shares held by institutional investors
as a percentage of the current total shares
outstanding
NSIDER PCT The number of shares held by insiders as a
percentage of the current total shares outstanding
ompany characteristics
EBT EQUITY Debt to equity ratios, which is long term debt
divided by total equity measured in percentage
IZE The natural log of market cap, where the market cap
is measured in millions of U.S. dollars
GE The number of years the company has been in
existence (up to 2010)
OLUME The 52-week average of the volume of shares
traded, which is measured in millions of shares
egal regime dummies
hina Dummy variable to indicate which legal regime a
firm is from, one is China and zero otherwise
ong Kong Dummy variable to indicate which legal regime a
firm is from, one is Hong Kong and zero otherwise
aiwan Dummy variable to indicate which legal regime a
firm is from, one is Taiwan and zero otherwise
tock exchange dummies
YSE Dummy variable which equals one if a firm’s stock
is listed on NYSE, and zero otherwise
MEX Dummy variable which equals one if a firm’s stock
is listed on AMEX, and zero otherwise
ASDAQ Dummy variable which equals one if a firm’s stock
is listed on NASDAQ, and zero otherwise
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